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Haiti: The South African perspective
Daniël J van Hoving, Wayne P Smith, Efraim B Kramer, Shaheem de Vries, Fathima Docrat, Lee A Wallis
The Haitian earthquake resulted in an outpouring of 
international rescue and relief.1 South Africa’s response 
consisted of the deployment of two non-government 
organisations (NGOs) working separately with minimal 
contact. This article describes the fragmented response and 
some of the problems experienced while in Haiti. More 
importantly, it argues the need to establish a unified South 
African disaster response system.
Fragmented SA response
The assistance from South Africa consisted of two independent 
NGOs: Rescue South Africa (RSA) and the Gift of the Givers 
Foundation. RSA dispatched a medium urban search and 
rescue (USAR) team comprising 2 civil engineers, 2 emergency 
doctors, 3 K9 rescue dogs with handlers, 4 media personnel 
and 31 search and rescue personnel (the latter from various 
metropolitan emergency services and provincial ambulance 
training colleges). The team arrived via a chartered flight with 
8.5 tons of equipment 5 days after the earthquake, and then set 
up camp at the Port au Prince International Airport together 
with other International Search and Rescue Advisory Group 
(INSARAG) international teams. They were given tasks every 
day by the INSARAG On-Site Operations Co-ordination Centre 
(OSOCC). The duration of the mission, which was specifically 
urban search and rescue, was 10 days.
The Gift of the Givers Foundation sent 4 teams, totalling 
53 individuals. The teams varied considerably, consisting of 
urban search and rescue personnel, health care professionals 
and a media contingent. The health care component included 
professional nurses, medical practitioners, specialist emergency 
physicians and an assortment of other specialists or registrars. 
The teams were deployed in a staged response, arriving 2 days 
apart with a 2-day overlap before departure. The first team 
was a dedicated USAR team, the second team had rescue and 
medical personnel, and the third and fourth teams were mainly 
medical personnel. The foundation also shipped donated aid 
supplies to Haiti.2
Areas of concern
While the organisations and individuals concerned worked 
with the very best interests of the affected population at heart, 
the response overall was far from perfect. The following 
problem areas inter alia were identified among the two NGOs:
•    There was no medical examination of, or notification 
of chronic medical conditions among, team members 
before departure; this resulted in several personnel being 
medically unfit to work in the demanding conditions in 
Haiti. Little attention was given to ensuring that members 
were up to date with vaccinations and taking malaria 
prophylaxis or personal medications. The health of each 
team member is critical to ensure a successful response.
•    No team members were specifically dedicated to fulfil 
the key role of logistic manager, medical manager or 
operational manager. As is often the case, no one takes 
responsibility if everyone is responsible for an action; this 
was seen in the Haitian response, and on many occasions 
inefficiencies occurred as people did things their own way.
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Background and problem statement. The South African response 
to the Haitian earthquake consisted of two independent non-
government organisations (NGOs) working separately with 
minimal contact. Both teams experienced problems during the 
deployment, mainly owing to not following the International 
Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG) guidelines.
Critical areas identified. To improve future South African 
disaster responses, three functional deployment categories 
were identified: urban search and rescue, triage and initial 
stabilisation, and definitive care. To best achieve this, 
four critical components need to be taken into account: 
rapid deployment, intelligence from the site, government 
facilitation, and working under the auspices of recognised 
organisations such as the United Nations and the World 
Health Organization.
Conclusion. The proposed way forward for South African 
medical teams responding to disasters is to be unified 
under a leading academic body, to have an up-to-date 
volunteer database, and for volunteers to be current with 
the international search and rescue course currently being 
developed by the Medical Working Group of INSARAG. An 
additional consideration is that South African rescue and 
relief personnel have a primary responsibility to the citizens 
of South Africa, then the Southern African Development 
Community region, then the rest of the African continent and 
finally further afield. The commitment of government, private 
and military health services as well as NGOs is paramount for 
a unified response.
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•    The use of commercial flights resulted in equipment 
being left in South Africa, forcing teams to work without 
essential tools, therefore limiting their spectrum of work. 
The transport of medical oxygen is also not permitted on 
commercial flights.
•    The lack of a formalised pre-departure briefing left 
everyone wondering what to expect, which unnecessarily 
elevated tensions in each team member. An emergency 
evacuation plan should also have been discussed before 
departure.
•    Formal trauma debrief sessions were not held to aid 
the integration of team members back into society. The 
volunteer teams, being exposed to large-scale destruction 
and death, are at high risk of developing post-traumatic 
stress disorders.3
•    International guidelines for daily calorie requirements were 
not adhered to. Lack of energy not only dampens teams’ 
spirits but, in addition, externally provided food sources in 
disaster situations are usually limited and are potentially 
unsafe, in addition to putting unnecessary demands on an 
already overstretched local supply chain.
•    Appropriate clothing for the local conditions was not 
adequately considered, leaving team members at risk of 
dehydration and other heat-related illnesses.
•    In a disaster situation, a deploying doctor is often required 
to function as safety officer, addressing issues such as the 
establishment and daily inspection of latrines, cleanliness of 
the camp, food storage and so on. Appropriate briefing and 
preparation is required for such tasks, which fall outside the 
remit of most doctors’ daily responsibilities.
The INSARAG guidelines are well known in disaster 
medicine circles and should be adhered too. These 
guidelines are intended as a reference for countries aiming 
to establish international USAR capabilities. It is a detailed 
recommendation from different contributing authors who have 
gained experience in developing domestic USAR capability 
and responding to both major domestic and international 
USAR incidents.4
Disaster preparedness
The South African response to the Haitian earthquake was 
not ideal. In plotting a way forward for South African medical 
teams to be prepared to respond to disasters, we must 
first consider what is expected of such teams once they are 
deployed. Three functional categories can be identified, based 
on tasks and assistance required: (i) search and rescue; (ii) 
triage and initial stabilisation; and (iii) definitive medical care.
Search and rescue
Major natural and man-made disasters result in enormous 
damage to buildings and other structures, which invariably 
results in the trapping or burial of people.5 Initial rescue 
is usually done by the local population. However, a more 
technical response may be required. International USAR teams 
must be able to deploy quickly to assist in such incidents. 
The survivability of trapped survivors decreases greatly with 
time.5 Deployment time is determined not only by having an 
equipped and able team available, but also by when a request 
for international assistance from the affected country is made.6 
The sooner the request is made, the sooner a prepared team 
can be deployed.
The required resources to deploy in the acute phase of search 
and rescue (SAR) are determined by the nature of the damage 
as well as the availability of suitable skills and equipment 
in the affected country. Therefore, intelligence from ‘ground 
zero’ is critical. This is now easier after the introduction of a 
virtual OSOCC.7 The role of the South African government, 
and especially of the Departments of Foreign Affairs and 
International Relations and Co-operation, as well as the 
National Disaster Management Centre, is critical in ensuring a 
smooth and timely deployment. Working under the auspices 
of global organisations such as INSARAG or the World Health 
Organization (WHO) is the last critical component for a 
medical response.6
The first phase of response encompasses SAR, and requires: 
(i) rapid deployment; (ii) intelligence from the site; (iii) 
government facilitation; and (iv) falling under the auspices of 
recognised organisations such as the UN and WHO.
Triage and stabilisation
The second of the functional categories is that of triage and 
initial stabilisation. This is an area where there is an overlap 
between rescue and relief efforts. Rescue is what is undertaken 
to release trapped or buried victims; emergency and critical 
care to trapped victims is still rescue. On the other hand, relief 
includes the medical services supplied to the majority of the 
population who are not trapped, as well as taking over the 
responsibility of medical care from the rescue team. Again, 
it requires rapid deployment of the most skilled persons for 
the job at hand, which can occur simultaneously with the 
SAR phase to set up medical systems to deliver patient care. 
The same four parameters listed above are critical to ensure 
appropriate and timely deployment of resources for this phase.
Definitive care
The third functional contingency (definitive care) entails the 
rendering of emergency as well as routine medical care to 
the affected population; it is usually done from temporary 
structures such as tented field hospitals. This category includes 
both relief and rehabilitation efforts, and can be divided into 
3 phases: (i) early emergency care (24 - 48 hours after the 
incident); (ii) intermediate phase (48 hours - 14 days); and (iii) a 
late phase that may continue for many months or even years.
It should be apparent that mapping the way forward must 
have, at its core, clear understanding as to how to incorporate 
the four critical components for a medical response, as 
previously stated.
The way forward – South Africa’s 
medical response
The Haiti response indicated the need for a single, official, 
centrally co-ordinated and properly prepared team to respond 
to disasters. This would be best done in conjunction with 
government bodies, while using the skills and experience of 
local NGOs.
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The specialty of emergency medicine, albeit a relative 
newcomer to the South African health care environment, has 
indeed made great strides in recent years.8 Disaster medicine 
is a discipline of emergency medicine that serves the dual 
purpose of providing medical care to the victims of a disaster 
as well as preparing for and mitigating such an eventuality. As 
such, this discipline should be a lead agency in formulating as 
well as facilitating a South African medical response.
A joint initiative has been proposed between the largest 
emergency medicine divisions in the country (at the 
universities of the Witwatersrand, Stellenbosch and Cape 
Town) to lead the way forward medically. Under this structure, 
an all-inclusive, multi-disciplinary medical team should be 
established to be trained, equipped and prepared to respond 
to local and international disasters. This structure would 
have academic credibility, be non-partisan, and include all 
key groups (including NGOs, government, doctors and EMS 
personnel). We propose that this falls under the auspices of 
the Emergency Medicine Society of South Africa (EMSSA), 
an organisation with a large member base from all aspects of 
emergency care (including doctors, nurses and EMS).
An international urban search and rescue course for medical 
personnel is currently being developed by the Medical Working 
Group of INSARAG.9 Attending the course should be a 
pre-requisite for deployment to a disaster area. A volunteer 
database will need to be established, consisting of personal 
details, skills, medical background, etc., which would further 
shorten the response time.
The commitment of government, private and military health 
services, as well as NGOs and academic structures is required 
to achieve these objectives. Furthermore, local acceptance of 
a central co-ordinating agency, rather than local individual 
teams preparing and deploying in isolation (which, while 
definitely contributing to the overall response, tends to be 
done in a haphazard manner and results in inefficient usage of 
deployable resources), is necessary. Only then will South Africa 
be able to respond in a unified manner.
Our final argument is that we represent a developing 
country. While we are relatively well off, we do not have 
the resources to respond half way across the world – and 
indeed our contribution in such settings is often minuscule 
by comparison with that of Western countries. Our primary 
responsibility is to the citizens of South Africa; we also have an 
obligation to the Southern African Development Community 
region and then to the rest of the African continent. Travelling 
for up to 5 days halfway around the globe to provide 3 days of 
assistance does not do justice to the commitment of resources 
and the dedication of the people involved.
Conclusion
Disasters are by their nature sudden and unpredictable; they 
can bring out the very best in people, with dedicated teams 
dropping their work and personal commitments to help in 
desperate and unpleasant situations. We should maximise the 
gain from such response by providing it in a co-ordinated and 
prepared manner, and focusing on where the greatest impact 
is possible. We are now progressing with the development of a 
central system, and ask readers to assist us in doing so.
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